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Abstract 
 
China’s trade surplus with the U.S. is now more than a quarter of the 
U.S. trade deficit and, with China growing faster than the U.S., raises 
questions about its future course. Some media commentators term the 
chronic trade surplus “mercantilist” but offer no persuasive motive for 
it. Academics taking the classical static view regard the trade surpluses 
as a policy error. We offer a rudimentary model in which trade surplus 
in the early years is central for an optimal growth trajectory. The 
novelty derives from two features of underdevelopment shaping trade 
between backward economies like China and advanced economies like 
the U.S. First, the initial comparative disadvantages in China are an 
artifact of the uneven technical advances made by the U.S., so China 
may be able to erase those disadvantages through technological 
transfers bought with surpluses of exports over imports in goods and 
services. Reserves may be accumulated to pay for large lumps of know-
how. Second, the diffusion of new products requires learning, which 
takes time, so the initial dearth of familiarity in China with a range of 
U.S. consumer goods operates as a drag on import demand for them, 
which may tip trade balances into surplus.
                                                           
*  The authors are, respectively, Glaubinger Professor of Business and McVickar 
Professor of Political Economy, Columbia University, and members of Columbia’s 
Center on Capitalism and Society.  Both authors thank the Kauffman Foundation 
for grants that supported this research. {ref.: ChinaTradeD2-16July05} 
A Dynamic Theory of China-U.S. Trade: 
Making Sense of the Imbalances 
 
by Amar Bhidé and Edmund S. Phelps
* 
 
1. Introduction 
We offer here a dynamic theory of the trade between China and the U.S. It is 
focused on key roles played by technology in underdevelopment and their 
influence on trade and growth in the process of development. We see the trade 
of goods and of know-how between China and the U.S. as co-evolving, both 
springing from an initially wide gap in know-how between such economies. 
The model is fundamentally different from the classical, static comparative-
advantage model of trade in showing that the optimal growth path for China 
could entail trade surpluses with the U.S. and the accumulation of large 
foreign exchange reserves. 
 
The present discourse does not convey an understanding of China’s 
trade imbalances with the U.S. Two commentaries aim to explain the current 
account deficit of the U.S. with the rest of the world as a whole. One blames it 
on the outsized budgetary deficit of the U.S. The other credits it to a powerful 
magnetism of the U.S. economy for global investors. However, whether or not 
either helps to explain the U.S. current account deficit in the aggregate, 
neither helps to explain China’s very large share of that deficit.
1 
 
Other commentators allege a kind of mercantilism in Chinese policy. 
In its monetarist form, China’s central bank is said to prevent the appreciation 
of its currency that would bring its trade into balance by purchasing U.S. 
Treasury instruments to offset its export surplus and, in a sort of asset reflux, 
the inflow of direct investments by overseas companies into China. In its non-
monetary form, China is said to be the prime exemplar of a new “global 
saving glut” in choosing (since 1990) to save well in excess of its domestic 
investment needs. These two explanations tacitly assume that China’s overall 
trade surplus must be massive but, in fact, it was only $ 32 billion in 2004 – 
about 2 per cent of Chinese GDP and less than 0.1 per cent of world GDP. 
This modest size reflects China’s much smaller surplus with Europe and its 
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deficits with its Asian trading partners. China’s mercantilism must therefore 
be half-hearted or somehow directed against the U.S. 
 
The commentary also does not contain a compelling motive for 
China’s policy. An explanation in the popular media is that China promotes 
exports in order to provide jobs to its surplus agricultural labor. But why 
would China employ a roundabout mechanism that subsidizes consumers 
abroad instead of, say, instituting a public works program at home? Other 
theories suggest that the export sector creates positive spillovers because of, 
for instance, the technical assistance provided by overseas customers. 
Although we are skeptical about the possibility, suppose that China’s rulers 
really do believe that producing shoes and apparel for export is transformative 
for the Chinese economy. Why should they also save some of their export 
earnings?  And why in the form of low-return currency reserves instead of 
investing them in high-return domestic projects? 
 
From the classical Ricardian point of view, which abhors trade 
surpluses and the accumulation of specie, China’s mercantilism is a policy 
mistake. But, as we see it, Ricardian models (as well as the standard theories 
of export led growth) fail to recognize two features of backwardness that 
affect trade between technologically advanced and technologically backward 
economies. First, the comparative advantages of the backward country are an 
artifact of uneven technological advances in the developed country, so that the 
comparative advantage of the backward country lies in the sectors where 
technology in the advanced country is the most rudimentary. Second, 
backwardness entails a paucity of consumer knowledge. Consumers in 
backward economies are simply unfamiliar with many of the goods made and 
consumed in rich countries. These include not just trendy or cutting edge 
items like video games but also goods like cosmetics and canned food that 
were once advanced but have now become commonplace in the West. 
 
These two features lead to evolutionary rather than stationary patterns 
of trade. In the trade between two technically advanced countries there is no 
expectation of changes ahead in comparative advantages or in their demand 
for each others’ exports. When an advanced economy trades with a backward 
economy, however, changes in comparative advantages occur if producers in 
the backward economy acquire some (if not all) of the know-how of the 
advanced economy. Similarly when a backward economy first opens up to 
trade with an advanced economy the paucity of consumer knowledge may 
dampen demand for some of the goods in which producers in the advanced 
economy have a comparative advantage. This effect gradually wears off as 
consumers become familiar with these goods. 
 
Our perspective also suggests subtle trade-offs in the use of seemingly 
mercantilist policies by a backward economy. A surplus in its exports of 
goods and services over its imports allows backward countries to pay for the 
know-how of advanced countries. Moreover, it may be technically or 
contractually difficult or economically undesirable to partition know-how, so   3
it may be optimal for the backward economy to save up its surpluses to buy 
large lumps of know-how in the future or to make payments on the debts it 
previously incurred for its know-how purchases.  And, if underdeveloped 
financial markets or other institutional deficiencies hinder the accumulation of 
the funds necessary to purchase know-how, then the maintenance of an 
exchange rate that generates a trade surplus and the investment of that surplus 
in dollar reserves may be welfare enhancing. On the other side, the paucity of 
consumer knowledge in the backward country, which naturally dampens the 
demand for imports and tilts the trade balance to a surplus, may make such 
policy interventions unnecessary or even counter-productive.  For example, a 
too low exchange rate may lead to the accumulation of more reserves than 
China needs for its long-run know-how purchases. 
 
Economic modeling in recent decades that incorporates disparities in 
levels of development offers little precedent for the perspective of this paper, 
if our review of the literature has found the main contributions.  The literature 
on trade between technological unequals typically focused on the barriers to 
trade between rich and poor countries. Linder (1961) showed that countries at 
similar stages of development trade with each other to a greater degree than 
they do with countries at different stages of development. 
 
Markusen (1986) provides a model for Linder’s findings in which 
richer countries both produce and demand more capital intensive goods. In the 
model by Murphy and Shleifer (1991), rich countries produce and consume 
goods of higher quality than do poor countries. Our model resembles Murphy 
and Shleifer’s in that the consumption pattern in rich and poor countries are 
different. Yet there are noteworthy differences, which may derive from the 
difference in context between our respective papers. Their paper which was 
written in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, provides a 
rationale for why producers in Eastern Europe might have nothing to sell to 
consumers in Western Europe (and vice versa). We are concerned with why 
China’s exports to the U.S. are booming when its imports from the U.S. are 
not. Furthermore, in their model, differences in the consumption of the rich 
West and the poor East derive from differences in their incomes. Their 
representative East European consumer, like their representative Western 
consumer, prefers a high quality BMW but buys a low quality Lada in order to 
conserve her meager purchasing power. In our model, the representative 
consumer in China, when the country first opens up for trade, lives in a rural 
commune and has no prior acquaintance with cars. Until learning about cars 
changes her preferences, she will not buy a car of any quality or price. Also, 
their model makes national productivity and incomes depend just on the 
presumably inalienable human capital of the workforce. In our model, there 
are no differences in human capital and the productivity of the workforce 
depends just on the technologies introduced. And, in contrast to human 
capital, which must be indigenously accumulated, China can purchase 
advanced technologies from the West without thereby reducing Western 
productivity. 
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The progenitor of our model is the model of China’s economic 
awakening to a world of great yet uneven technical advances in Phelps (2004) 
and Samuelson (2004). In Phelps’s story, China and the U.S. – more generally 
the West – were at one time alike, thus not trading partners. With the technical 
advances it subsequently instituted in manufacturing, the West came into 
possession of an artificial comparative advantage vis-à-vis China in 
manufacturing. Once China opens itself to trade with the West, both China 
and the West realize gains from classical Ricardian trade. Later, though, 
China’s acquisition of the advanced technology from the West annihilates the 
comparative advantages of the trading partners and causes a return to autarky. 
 
We extend this parable in several ways. For one thing, it does not 
discuss whether the Western technologies are absorbed through study and 
perhaps pirating or acquired through licensing or purchase; and if the latter, 
how China pays for the technology acquired.  Here we draw on the suggestion 
in Bhide (2004) that the developmental significance of LDC exports lies in the 
wherewithal they provide for importing know-how rather than goods from 
developed countries. For another, we analyze how dynamics of the acquisition 
of know-how and of the learning by Chinese consumers of Western goods 
affects the evolution of trade patterns in the transitional period from the time 
China opens up to trade until it returns to autarky. And we discuss the 
challenges of formulating public policies that can help keep trade on an 
optimal evolutionary path. 
 
2. A Model of Know-how Acquisition and Trade 
We have modeled the evolution of the China trade in a spreadsheet. The main 
features and inferences of the model are as follows:  As in the Murphy and 
Shleifer (1991) model and papers by Phelps (2004) and Samuelson (2004), we 
posit a world comprising two countries.  We will refer to one of these 
countries as the U.S. but it could also represent the set of developed 
economies as a whole.  Similarly we will refer to the other country as China 
but it could represent all LDCs. Both countries, that are identical in every 
respect, start out in a primordial state, making a variety of goods purely for 
their own consumption.  Subsequently, thanks to its innovative 
entrepreneurial system, the U.S. dramatically improves its know-how for 
making some goods (which we call A goods) but not others (which we call B 
goods).  In China however, more than a century of wars, revolutionary 
governments and isolation keep the production of all goods in the primordial 
way.  
  
At the end of the extended era of backwardness, period zero, a regime 
change in China brings in a benevolent dictator who aims to raise Chinese 
living standards to a level approximating that in the U.S.  To analyze the 
choices facing the new ruler we make the following simplifying assumptions:  
  
We stipulate that consumers in both countries regard the basket of B 
goods (comprising items such as shoes and underwear) as an absolute 
necessity, and demand one basket – and only one basket – per capita per   5
period.   The basket of A goods (comprising items such as cosmetics and 
bottled cola drinks) is regarded as a luxury, that has utility only after the B 
basket has been satisfied.  But, in contrast to the B basket, more A baskets 
provide more utility.   No one values leisure (or attaches any disutility to 
work) and no one has any time preference for consumption.  These 
stipulations provide a simple measure of utility:  provided the demand for B 
goods has been satisfied, welfare increases monotonically with the 
consumption of A goods; and aggregate welfare over multiple periods 
increases with the sum of the consumption of A goods across these periods.     
  
On the supply side we stipulate that production of both kinds of goods 
requires only effort, and not any capital equipment or costly raw materials.  
Production cannot be stockpiled -- goods must be consumed in the period in 
which they are produced.  Labor can be used to produce A or B goods, 
creating the production possibility frontiers shown in Figure 1. 
 
Base case: Classical Ricardian trade. 
 
Suppose that in period 1 China’s new ruler merely “opens up” the 
country to trade with the U.S.  Classical Ricardian trade theory predicts that 
living standards in both countries will be improved if China specializes in 
making B goods and U.S. in making A goods.  But although trading Chinese-
made B goods for U.S.-made A goods improves living standards in China it 
does not raise them to U.S. standards unless the terms of trade are such that 
China receives every last bit of the gains from trade.
2  Moreover 
transportation costs, broadly defined, limit gains from classical trade.  
Although transportation costs may be small for goods such as cosmetics, for 
other goods such as bottled soft-drinks they can represent a significant portion 
of total marginal costs.   
 
Trade with interventionist import restraints 
 
The above difficulties of catching up through classical Ricardian trade 
may cause China’s ruler to favor trading B goods for the U.S. know-how with 
which to make A goods rather than for the A goods themselves.  And to the 
extent that transportation costs exceed the economies of scale in producing for 
both countries, transferring know-how to China increases total welfare (i.e. 
the sum of A goods consumed in China and the U.S.).  But how does China 
pay for the know-how owned by U.S. producers of A goods?   
  
Our model assumes that the producers in the U.S. are willing to trade 
one basket of A goods for α baskets of B goods. In return for its export of the 
B good, China can take immediate delivery of the A goods or accumulate 
credits for future purchases; but, because U.S. producers don’t trust China, 
they will not sell A goods on credit (i.e ship the A goods in one period and 
receive B goods in a later period).  Similarly U.S. producers are willing to 
trade their entire know-how for N  baskets of B goods, where (N > α) and are 
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prepared to receive payment through credits previously accumulated by China 
but are unwilling to sell their know-how against future receipts of B goods. 
  
If China’s export proceeds are all used to pay for imports, there will be 
nothing left over to pay for know-how.  China’s ruler may therefore restrain 
imports by decreeing that some proportion of export earnings be set aside to 
pay for know-how purchases; we can think of this decree as an import tax or a 
forced saving program whose proceeds go into a know-how purchase account. 
  
Suppose that know-how can somehow be sold on a proportionate basis 
– for instance if China offers N/2 baskets of B goods, U.S. producers will sell 
advanced know-how for enough components of the A basket to halve the gap 
between Chinese and U.S. productivity in the basket as a whole.  But, will it 
behoove China to acquire and use know-how on a piecemeal basis?   
  
For expositional purposes, let us make the plausible assumption that 
China would immediately start using the know-how that it has paid for, rather 
than stockpiling the know-how for later use.  Clearly, China will not purchase 
and use U.S. know-how, if after such a purchase it can still import A goods on 
better terms.  Now suppose China’s accumulation of credits reaches a level 
where domestic production of A goods becomes worthwhile.  But, whereas 
this import substitution increases China’s short term consumption of A goods, 
it also absorbs workers who would otherwise make B goods for export to the 
U.S. and thus ends any further accumulation of credits. 
  
Therefore, in order to achieve full catch-up – and maximize the total 
long term consumption of China and the world – China must wait until it has 
accumulated the necessary N credits before producing any A goods.  During 
the periods in which this accumulation is taking place, China will run a trade 
and current account “surplus” with the U.S. (unless for some reason China 
buys and stockpiles know-how instead of credits).  Then, in the single period 
during which China exchanges its credits for know-how, the U.S will have a 
large current account “surplus.”  Thereafter, as in the Phelps and Samuelson 
papers, there will be no further trade. 
  
Notice that the number of periods of it takes for China to accumulate N 
credits decreases monotonically with the magnitude of the import tax (i.e. 
higher tax rates lead to faster catch-up).  Faster catch-up in turn increases 
China’s total long-run consumption of A goods.  Moreover, assuming that 
importing A goods from the U.S. involves at least some transportation costs, 
faster catch up increases overall welfare (See Figure 2).  Therefore there is no 
conflict between the policy favored by a benevolent Chinese dictator and a 
social planner who favors the joint welfare of both countries – both will favor 
a high import tax regime.  Controlling for the terms trade, a planner who 
wants to maximize just the U.S interests may however (depending on the 
values of α and N) favor a zero-tax regime, with no know-how transfer (i.e. 
continued Ricardian trade). 
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Trade with learning restraints 
 
To demonstrate why import taxes may not be necessary for catch-up 
and could in fact be counterproductive, we will modify our assumption about 
Chinese demand for A type goods.  Thus far we have assumed that Chinese 
consumers have exactly the same preferences for such goods as U.S. 
consumers.  This may be true for some Chinese consumers.  It is reasonable to 
believe that before China “opens up” many members of the urban elite crave 
Western goods that have hitherto been unavailable on unaffordable.  But could 
there have been much pent up demand for lipstick or shampoos among the 
collectivized peasants in remote provinces?  How many such individuals 
would even have encountered such products or known how to use them? 
   
In fact, history suggests that tastes for many goods now in common 
use in the developed world were acquired rather than innate.  Cautious 
consumers purchase new goods after observing the gratification of 
venturesome early adopters.  Or they purchase only after being educated about 
the uses of the product by the marketing efforts of the suppliers.  Sometimes 
the demand for new products spreads like wildfire; in other cases it may take a 
decade or longer.  In any event it is not instantaneous.   
  
These learning effects, we would expect, drive a wedge between the 
ultimate demand for the A type goods and the immediate demand when China 
opens up to trade.  And, we can think of the initial ignorance as a natural 
restraint on the imports of A goods that diminishes over time.  We have 
modeled this in our spreadsheet as follows. China starts with a low total 
demand for A goods when it first opens to trade.  In subsequent periods, 
demand equals actual consumption in the prior period times a fixed learning 
effect.  Low demand in the early periods in turn generates the trade surpluses 
that allow China to accumulate the credits it needs to purchase U.S. know-
how. 
  
Relying on learning instead of taxes or tariffs to finance catch-up 
generates some noteworthy differences in our model.  First, full catch-up does 
not require China to wait until it has accumulated the credits necessary to 
purchase the full amount of U.S. know-how.  China doesn’t get locked into a 
low level of know-how even if it starts by buying partial amounts of the 
know-how, because in the early periods total demand for A goods is 
depressed.  China can satisfy all its domestic demand (for A and B goods) and 
still have labor available to produce B goods for export.  Moreover, our model 
shows that if it waits, China may never be able to accumulate the credits it 
needs for complete know-how purchase.  This is because the restraint that the 
learning effect imposes on imports wears off; and as it wears off, China’s rate 
of accumulation of credits declines and may eventually become negative 
before it has accumulated the necessary credits.  Therefore an early partial 
purchase may be required for full catch-up, (see Figures 3.1. and 3.2) unless, 
as in the previous case, the Chinese ruler also restrains imports through a tax 
or forced savings scheme.     8
  
A second noteworthy difference lies in the conflicts between the 
timing of know-how purchases that maximizes the welfare of China’s 
consumers and the timing that maximizes the aggregate welfare of consumers 
in China and the U.S.  As mentioned, in the prior case (with no learning 
effects) there is no conflict: given transportation costs, no matter how small, 
Chinese welfare and total welfare is maximized when China imposes high 
import taxes and purchases know-how as soon as it has accumulated the 
credits it needs for a full purchase of U.S. know-how.  With learning effects, 
maximizing China’s welfare entails purchasing the first installment of know-
how at the point where even the partial improvement in productivity makes it 
cheaper for China to make its own A goods instead of importing them.  If 
however, total welfare is to be maximized, the Chinese purchase of know-how 
occurs at a later point. 
  
Third, the learning effect does not, on its own, ensure that China will 
be able to afford full catch-up.  In the previous case, catch-up is fast when 
import taxes are high, but even with low taxes China does eventually 
accumulate the necessary N credits.   If imports are restrained by learning 
effects rather than by taxes however, full catch-up does not occur if the rate of 
learning is too high or too low.  If the rate of learning exceeds a threshold, all 
export earnings are quickly applied to importing cars, with relatively little left 
over to pay for know-how; and, regardless of when China starts purchasing 
know-how, it can never fully catch-up.  Moreover, when learning rates are 
very fast, classical Ricardian trade (i.e. with no know-how transfer) 
maximizes total (China + U.S.) consumption, so even partial Chinese catch-up 
occurs at the expense of overall welfare.  Conversely, the absence of learning, 
or a very slow rate of learning, limits the value China derives from the imports 
either of A goods or of the know-how for their manufacture; this may 
extinguish China’s incentives to engage in any trade. 
 
Fourth, world welfare is maximized (for non-zero transportation costs) 
at the top end of the learning range in which full catch-up is possible.  As 
mentioned, if learning is extremely slow (and starts at a low enough level) the 
optimal outcome may be no trade, unless China is willing (or compelled) to 
indefinitely accumulate credits instead of receiving goods or know-how in 
return for its exports.  If learning is fast enough to permit trade, total 
consumption first increases with learning rates; then, after the rate exceeds a 
level that precludes full catch up, total consumption declines (See Figure 4).  
In contrast, as we have already seen, higher import taxes (which we can think 
of as the analog for slow learning) always increase total consumption.   
 
Fifth, the reversion to autarky occurs more gradually.  In the previous 
case, China waits till it has accumulated N credits and then abruptly switches 
its labor from exporting B goods to making A goods for domestic substitution.  
When learning effects are relied upon to finance know-how, we have seen that 
the purchases occur in installments, and China continues to export (at a 
reduced rate) after the first installment has been purchased.  More   9
intriguingly, our model suggests that China may continue to export even after 
it has acquired the full amount of U.S. know-how.  This is because parity in 
know-how may be reached before China has fully learned to consume A 
goods.  Then China may continue exporting B goods and accumulating credits 
for A good purchases until demand also “catches up.”  Then after demand has 
caught up trade will continue until the credits accumulated by China are offset 
by imports of A goods from the U.S.  This final pre-autarky stage has China 
running trade deficits and enjoying greater prosperity than the U.S. 
 
Purchasing know-how on credit. 
 
So far, we assumed that the U.S. owners demand immediate payment 
(in B baskets or accumulated credits) for their advanced know-how. What 
would happen instead if U.S. producers were willing to sell their know-how 
on credit – i.e. transfer the know-how now against a promise of N baskets of 
B later? We find that the welfare maximizing outcomes are remarkably 
similar to those we would expect under high restraints (due to tariffs or 
learning effects) on Chinese imports of A goods.  Given non-zero 
transportation costs, it will be optimal for China to acquire immediately (on 
credit) all the know-how required for full catch-up. This would eliminate any 
demand for imports from the U.S.  However, to repay the debt incurred to 
purchase the know-how China would then have to export goods to the U.S.  In 
other words (just as with import restraints) we would observe multiple periods 
during which China ran trade surpluses with the U.S. and a single period 
during which the US would record a large current account surplus.  The 
principal difference would be that the U.S. current account surplus would 
precede rather than follow its trade deficits.   
 
Additionally, depending on the relative costs of transporting A and B 
goods and the rate at which China learns to consume A goods, Chinese 
exports might comprise A goods instead of B goods.  In other words, up-front 
know-how transfer could lead to the U.S imports of goods that under classical 
Ricardian theories it would be expected to export. 
 
3. Policy Implications 
 
Our model suggests that interventionist polices which might improve 
living standards if policymakers had perfect foresight can be 
counterproductive if they do not. For instance, if learning is too fast to allow 
full catch-up, the Chinese ruler could use taxes (or other restraints) to tamp 
down on imports.  In addition to allowing full catch-up for China, this 
‘mercantilist’ intervention also may increase overall welfare.  But, if learning 
is already in a range which permits full catch-up, interventions that further 
curtail imports will have the opposite effect – they reduce welfare, for China 
and in the aggregate.   Designing an interventionist policy therefore requires 
knowledge of the rate of learning.  But the rate of learning is difficult to 
predict or even observe; and an overestimate of the rate can lead to a welfare 
reducing policy.   10
 
Interventions intended to hasten learning can produce 
counterproductive results.  For example the Chinese government may try to 
accelerate a rate that is too low by subsidizing the purchase of cars (e.g. by 
providing tax breaks to car owners).  Such a policy will be welfare enhancing 
only if it does not push the rate of learning into the range which precludes full 
catch-up; and predicting whether this will occur involves a subjective 
judgment that is fraught with the possibility of error. 
 
The Chinese ruler who assumes responsibility for managing the 
country’s trade and credit balances also faces the risk of misestimating the 
terms of trade for imported goods and know-how.  In our model we assumed 
that these terms were fixed.  If they are not, the Chinese ruler who 
misestimates these terms could start purchasing know-how too early or too 
late, and as a consequence may end up with too few credits for full catch up or 
more credits than are optimal for maximizing welfare.  (Although the Chinese 
ruler can technically correct mistakes through mid-course adjustments, as a 
practical matter such policy changes are difficult to implement – not the least 
because they may involve an admission of error.  Frequent policy changes can 
also make it difficult for other decision makers in China to make long term 
plans.) 
 
The Chinese ruler may be able to mitigate some of these risks if the 
U.S. producers of A goods were willing to sell their advanced know-how on 
credit.  For instance, if U.S. producers license their know-how to a Chinese 
producer or if they establish a subsidiary in China that uses advanced 
technology, the problem of incomplete catch-up disappears.  One policy 
mechanism to encourage such transfers is the provision of tax breaks to 
foreign companies.  And indeed China has used this approach, levying a 15% 
tax on the incomes of foreign owned firms compared to a 33% rate for 
domestic firms, with considerable apparent success.  The effectiveness of the 
policy has been undermined however by the practice of “round-tripping” 
whereby domestic firms send capital abroad and bring it back to China in the 
guise of foreign investment.  Anecdotal evidence also suggests that foreign 
investors favor projects with relatively quick payback – a preference which 
may have tilted the inflow of know-how towards the manufacture of export 
oriented B-type goods such as shoes and textiles. 
 
The Chinese ruler can also encourage the transfer of know-how 
against deferred rather immediate payment through institutional interventions.  
For instance U.S. producers are more likely to license their know-how if they 
have confidence in the enforcement of their contracts with Chinese licensors.  
Similarly they will be more willing to transfer their know-how to their 
Chinese subsidiaries if they are confident about the protections afforded by 
the legal system to their trade secrets.  But although reforms of the legal 
system may be necessary for confidence building, they are not sufficient.  
Confidence building also requires the passage of time.  Nor can reforms of the 
legal system protect U.S. producers against expropriation of their know-how   11
by the Chinese government itself.  Therefore, possibly for some extended 
period the Chinese ruler may have to make judgments about the benefits and 
risks of trade related interventions. 
 
What about the implications for U.S. policy makers?  On the surface it 
might seem that, as discussed in Phelps (2004) and Samuelson (2004), and in 
contrast to classical trade theory, our model suggests a conflict between U.S. 
and Chinese welfare.  For instance, (with learning effects and non-zero 
transportation costs) the speed of catch-up in our model that maximizes world 
consumption does not maximize U.S. consumption.  As mentioned, world 
welfare is maximized when catch-up occurs more slowly than is optimal from 
China’s point of view.  U.S. welfare is maximized at an even slower rate (than 
is optimal for world welfare) or (as in the prior Phelps model) there is no 
catch-up at all.  Thus it might seem to be in the national interest for U.S. 
policy makers to resist or even try to thwart the measures that China’s ruler 
might take to hasten the acquisition and use of U.S. know-how.  
 
Notice however that our model contains some crucial simplifying 
assumptions:  U.S. know-how remains frozen after China opens up and the 
U.S. ‘consumes’ its entire share of the gains from trade while China ‘saves’ at 
least some of its share to purchase know-how. This is an expositionally 
convenient but somewhat implausible stipulation. It is more realistic to 
assume that U.S entrepreneurs will continue innovating after China opens up, 
possibly to develop entirely new kinds of A goods.  In fact the rate of 
innovation may increase if U.S. entrepreneurs have access to some of the 
additional resources that become available because of trade. 
 
Moreover China doesn’t have to buy the know-how it needs to 
improve its productivity.  It’s plausible that whatever institutional constraints 
precluded Chinese entrepreneurs from developing know-how under the old 
regime may be eased or removed by the new regime.  Therefore if China is 
prevented or discouraged from purchasing U.S. know-how, Chinese 
entrepreneurs may develop know-how on their own.  This reinvention is not 
only socially wasteful, it may also reduce the earnings of U.S. exporters of 
goods and know-how and perhaps also reduce the rate of development of new 
know-how.  Therefore policies that directly or indirectly discourage Chinese 
purchases of U.S. know-how may harm long-run standards of living in both 
countries. 
 
An extension of our model suggests a counter-intuitive consequence of 
the pressure on U.S. policy makers exerted by U.S. workers whose interests 
might be injured by imports from China.  Our model assumed that labor can 
be freely transferred between the production of A and B goods.  Suppose 
instead that workers producing B goods in the U.S. cannot be redeployed and 
that their incomes are diminished by imports from China.  The conventional 
story is that lobbying by B workers to curtail imports through tariffs and 
quotas reduces welfare.  But there is also a subtle alternative possibility.  
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Notice that the U.S. production of B goods increases with the speed of 
China’s catch-up in A goods (because fast catch-up quickly annihilates its 
comparative advantage in B goods).  Therefore workers in the B goods 
industry should favor at least some policies (e.g. weak intellectual property 
protections for Western know-how or high tariffs in China on the import of A 
goods) that lead to faster catch-up than would suit the overall U.S. interest.  
But as mentioned, the overall U.S. interest may favor slower catch-up than is 
optimal for the world as a whole.  In other words, the interests of U.S. 
workers in the B industry may be more closely aligned than the national 
interest with overall welfare than is commonly believed.
3 
 
Finally, our analysis suggests caution on the part of U.S. policy 
makers in relying on trade data to make inferences about the extent of Chinese 
protectionism or the health of the U.S economy.  Tariffs and import quotas 
clearly are unambiguously protectionist.  But, the question of whether China’s 
fixed exchange rate is protectionist cannot be easily resolved by examining 
the size of its trade surplus with the U.S. or its accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves.  Similarly U.S. trade deficits with China, or even overall, 
and its borrowings from Chinese and other foreign sources of capital are not 
necessarily an indicator of economic ill-health.  The U.S. is well ahead of 
other large advanced economies in its per capita incomes – therefore we 
should expect it to serve as an exceptionally strong magnet for the import of B 
type goods from China and other emerging economies.  And, high per capita 
incomes in the U.S. likely derive from high levels of innovative activity, so 
the country may also represent a large net source of know-how for the rest of 
the world.  Consequently U.S. current account deficits, even of indefinite 
duration, do not by themselves represent a cause for alarm.  (Whether these 
deficits can remain at current levels is a different matter however and lies 
outside the scope of our analysis.)  
 
 
4.  Historical parallels and contrasts 
 
China’s trade surpluses might appear to be unusual in light of the 
balance of payment crises suffered by many developing countries.  In fact 
they conform to age-old patterns in trade between rich and poor countries. 
According to the data in Maddison (1990), from about 1840 until the start of 
the Second World War, exports from most countries that were considered 
developing after the War (with the notable exceptions of Korea and Taiwan) 
exceeded their imports.  In most countries now considered developed however 
imports exceeded exports.  These net importers include Japan – a country that 
allegedly followed a strategy of export led growth. 
 
                                                           
3 Arguably, the theft or copying of U.S. know-how reduces welfare by depriving U.S. producers of the 
funds they could use to finance further innovations.  Such an argument however supposes that 
finance represents a binding constraint for further innovation in the U.S. and that payments for 
know-how will in fact be invested in further innovation rather than consumed.   13
The excess of exports over imports in the developing countries cannot 
be explained by the mercantilist policies of their rulers.  Countries like India 
and Indonesia were colonies, and did not have the option of pursuing 
mercantilist policies.  Yet, as Maddison’s data shows, their exports exceeded 
their imports by a wide margin before these countries became independent.  
Could it be that the surpluses reflected a forcible extraction of resources from 
the colonies?  It is true that Britain applied some of India’s trade surplus to 
defray so-called home charges.  Indian trade surpluses also resulted in the 
accumulation of sterling deposits which we can regard as a source of cheap 
loans to Britain.   
 
There is no evidence to suggest however that British governments 
prevented Indian consumers from importing British-made goods or in any 
way discouraged British producers from exporting their wares to India.  In 
fact according to the prevailing imperial ideology (and Marxist analyses) 
colonies were supposed to provide captive export markets for their European 
colonizers.  It is also noteworthy that Korea and Taiwan ran trade deficits 
when they were colonies of Japan, and it is hard to believe that Japan had a 
greater interest in the well being of its colonies than did Britain. 
 
But whatever imperial Japan’s intentions might have been, Maddison 
argues that Japan was considerably more successful in industrializing its 
colonies and thus in producing trade deficits in Korea and Taiwan.  The 
colonial Indian economy in contrast did not show much development.  In the 
last half century of British rule in India (which covers roughly the same years 
as the period of the Japanese colonization of Korea and Taiwan) real per 
capita incomes actually declined (Maddison 1971). 
 
Apparently colonial surpluses reflected a lack of economic 
development.  Natural endowments provided classical comparative 
advantages in exporting agricultural produce and commodities.  But their low 
per capita incomes and stagnant economies limited their capacity to absorb 
imports from European metropoles.  Per capita income in India in 1900 for 
instance was about 4 percent of the per capita income of Great Britain.  
Therefore even though net imports of cloth accounted for about half of total 
consumption in India between 1900 and 1904 (Tomlinson 1993) the total 
value of Indian imports was small.  Inflows of Western know-how and capital 
that could have raised productivity and incomes were also apparently paltry.   
 
This is obviously not the case with China today.  Imports of goods and 
know-how may lag exports, but they are far from moribund.  China is also 
upgrading its know-how at rapid clip.  What might explain the difference 
between the rapid development of China today and the stagnation of colonial 
India?  British colonial policies were strongly oriented towards free domestic 
markets, free international trade and a low tax regime.  Arguably the rule of 
law and the property rights were stronger under British rule in India than they 
are in China today.  What then discouraged British companies from setting up   14
operations in India on a scale commensurate with the potential market in 
India? 
  
We speculate that one possible reason (but by no means the only or the 
most important one) is that technological and organizational innovations have 
made it much easier to transfer know-how from developed economies to 
technically backward countries.  If our speculation is right, this has profound 
implications for theories of trade and development.   
 
Ricardo formulated the now classical model of trade at a time when by 
modern standards, the technological frontier had not advanced much and the 
differences in the levels of development between the countries Ricardo was 
interested in were small compared to the immutable differences in their 
natural endowments.  Subsequently, differences in development and know-
how became much more pronounced.  Nevertheless to the extent that know-
how could not be easily transferred (because it was embedded in individual 
human capital) traditional theories, which assumed immutable comparative 
advantages, provided an adequate analysis.  If however, comparative 
advantages have become more mutable and indeed trade has become a critical 
instrument of their change, we need theories that focus on these dynamic 
effects.    15
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